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I.  INTRODUCTION 
An enduring duality continues to define the debate over how to pay for American 
health care.  On one side stands the traditional American ideals of individuality and 
personal autonomy; these strong cultural values support the idea that our 
accomplishments, including our ability to pay for our own health care, should reflect 
personal effort rather than the benefits of a charity state.1  On the other side stands 
the evolving belief that health care represents a “public good.”2  As such, the need 
for health care may be considered a basic need, like food or shelter, and there may 
even exist an innate right to such care. 
In many ways, our current system of private commercial insurance epitomizes 
these ideals of individuality and personal accomplishment.  Private insurance 
policies are acquired either as part of an employment package or purchased from a 
private insurer at personal cost.3  Whether structured along managed care lines or 
                                                                
*Associate Medical Director of Community Hospice of Northeast Florida in Jacksonville. 
1See Philip Lee, Politics, Health Policy, and the American Character, 17 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 7, 8, 9-13 (2006) (arguing that Americans rely on market forces to reflect personal 
responsibility and individual effort, that the growing political polarization we are witnessing 
results from this continuing dichotomy between personal independence and shared societal 
merit, and that this move towards a more conservative philosophy of personal autonomy “is 
the impetus for a series of public policy initiatives that may further exacerbate existing social 
inequalities”).  
2Id. at 16. 
3See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, 20 (2006), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf (“Census Bureau broadly classifies health 
insurance coverage as private coverage or government coverage. Private health insurance is a 
plan provided through an employer or a union or purchased by an individual from a private 
company. Government health insurance includes the federal programs Medicare, Medicaid, 
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traditional fee-for-service, these policies generally delineate with care a list of 
supported services for which the policy will pay.  The policy may only partially 
cover the cost of a particular treatment in which case the remaining costs incurred 
become the responsibility of the individual.   
In contrast, Medicare was born in the era of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
“Great Society.”4  Its passage marked a commitment to the idea that ensuring 
adequate health care for the American populace was more an issue of societal merit 
than personal economic resourcefulness.  Even so, that commitment was far from 
unanimous and the birth of Medicare also marked the beginning of an enduring and 
public debate over health care as a matter of social justice or market economics.5  
Increasingly, the question of continuing national health care coverage would turn on 
whether health care constituted a public good “differentiated by society for its own 
highest purposes, not a business to be exploited” or a matter of market economics, to 
be shaped by “the fundamentals of our political economy – capitalistic, pluralistic, 
and competitive.”6 
Both systems struggle to cope with rising health care costs today.  The cost of 
private insurance has placed it outside the reach of many individuals.7  Rising 
premiums have also made it impossible for many small corporations to continue to 
offer employer-sponsored health insurance which has resulted in a steady increase in 
the number of uninsured Americans since 2000.8  Furthermore, recent studies 
suggest that uninsured Americans who later become eligible for Medicare benefits 
often incur greater health care costs than those who had been insured prior to 
attaining Medicare coverage status.9  Approximately forty-seven million Americans 
                                                           
and military health care; the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP); and 
individual state health plans”). 
4See Charlotte Twight, Medicare’s Origin: The Economics and Politics of Dependency, 16 
CATO J. 309, 313 (1997) (“Medicare’s passage was anything but a spontaneous societal 
embrace of one of the pillars of President Lyndon Johnson’s ‘Great Society’.”). 
5Lee, supra note 1, at 16-17. 
6Id. at 16, 18. 
7See CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, THE NUMBER OF UNINSURED AMERICANS 
CONTINUED TO RISE IN 2004, (2005), http://www.cbpp.org/8-30-05health.htm (stating that, in 
addition to a reduction in the percentage of individuals with employer-sponsored health 
insurance plans, “there are signs that private coverage is weakening for those who have 
coverage,” that “[a] recent survey found that more than one-third of adults have problems 
paying medical bills and encounter related problems of access to care,” and that both the 
uninsured as well as insured individuals with high deductibles are more likely to encounter 
problems when attempting to obtain and afford necessary health care)[hereinafter CBPP].   
8See NATIONAL COALITION ON HEALTH CARE, FACTS ON HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 
(2007), http://www.nchc.org/facts/coverage_fact_sheet_2007.pdf (reporting a steady increase 
in the number of uninsured Americans since 2000 primarily as a result of decreasing numbers 
of employer-sponsored health plans and noting an increased likelihood of health care 
insurance coverage with increasing income).  
9See  Ed Edelson, Uninsured Americans Raise Medicare Expenditures, HEALTHDAY 
REPORTER (July 11, 2007), available at http://www.covenanthealth.org/healthday/7_2007/606 
311 (stating that “Americans who weren’t insured before they reached age sixty-five and 
gained access to Medicare cost the program a lot more than those who did have health 
insurance” with thirteen percent more physician visits, twenty percent more hospitalizations, 
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went without health care insurance coverage in 2005.10  Another sixteen million 
Americans had insufficient health care insurance coverage.11 
Similarly, the escalating cost of Medicare expenditures has become legendary.  
Current Medicare costs total approximately $374 billion, which is equivalent to 
fourteen percent of the federal budget.12  Medicare costs are expected to escalate to 
$524 billion by 2011.13   
The trend in coping with these rising Medicare costs has been to increase the role 
that private insurance plays in providing coverage for Medicare recipients.  Much of 
this movement towards an increased “privatization” of Medicare has been born of 
the belief that the private sector of health care insurance coverage has been made 
more efficient by existing market forces and will provide a way to both continue 
providing health care to elderly Americans while containing Medicare costs through 
these increased efficiencies as exemplified through the managed care model.   
This premise will be further explored in this article.  First, this article will review 
an abbreviated history of private sector managed care as well as the origins of 
Medicare.  Second, it will review the basic structure of the Medicare Modernization 
Act of 2003 (MMA) as it was first introduced and discuss how the MMA continues 
to evolve in the face of escalating health care demands.  Finally, it will address how 
the MMA seeks to ration health care within the Medicare system and how such 
rationing has proven problematic in the private sector as well as discussing some of 
the troubling implications of our current parameters for rationed health care. 
Ultimately, a detailed analysis of Medicare’s foundations lies outside the scope 
of this article as does any prediction regarding its extended future.  Even a cursory 
review of the complex issues that have helped to form today’s Medicare program 
proves that defining the future of that program would be daunting at best.14  All too 
                                                           
and fifty-one percent higher total medical expenses incurred by those previously 
uninsured)[hereinafter NIH].  See also J. Michael McWilliams et al., Use of Health Services 
by Previously Uninsured Medicare Beneficiaries, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 143, 151 (2007) 
(“Near-elderly adults who were uninsured required more intensive and costlier care in the 
Medicare program after the age of sixty-five years than previously insured adults who were 
otherwise similar at ages fifty-nine to sixty. Therefore, providing health insurance coverage 
for uninsured near-elderly adults may improve their health outcomes and reduce their health 
care use and spending after age sixty-five and that “these benefits may be substantial and may 
partially offset the costs of expanding coverage.”). 
10See NATIONAL COALITION ON HEALTH CARE, supra note 8. 
11See DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMITTEE, NUMBER OF UNINSURED AMERICANS INCREASES, 
AGAIN (Sept. 6, 2005), http://democrats.senate.gov/dpc/dpc-printable.cfm?doc_name=fs-109-
1-85.  See also Cathy Schoen et al., Insured But Not Protected: How Many Adults are 
Underinsured?, HEALTH AFFAIRS (PROJECT HOPE), Jun. 14, 2005, at w5-299 (June 14, 2005) 
(reporting that fifty-four percent of the underinsured and fifty-nine percent of the uninsured 
describe going without needed medical care, that “having inadequate insurance as well as 
being uninsured undermines access to care, satisfaction, and confidence in the quality of care 
obtained,” and that “[a]ccess barriers reported by the underinsured at times approach rates 
observed among uninsured adults.”). 
12NIH, supra note 9. 
13Id. 
14See Theodore Marmor, Medicare and Political Analysis: Omissions, Understandings, 
and Misunderstandings, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1137, 1156 (2003). 
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often, however, the ongoing debate regarding Medicare’s future reduces to an over-
simplified balancing of economic forces alone, present and anticipated. After only 
cursory examination, considerations of public policy increasingly fall to the side.  
Without doubt, Medicare’s future will continue to be shaped by the tides of 
economics, politics, and public policy.  This article argues only for open 
consideration of the implications of those resulting policies and how these will 
reflect our society and its most enduring values. 
II.  PAYING FOR HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 
Technological advances, a growing elderly population and increasing public 
expectations have worked together to increase the cost of health care.15  With rising 
costs has come the question of how to afford the health care we need.  In the private 
sector, commercial insurance plans have relied on managed care models to ration 
health care services which utilize a combination of explicit rationing, such as 
limiting the range of reimbursable services, and implicit rationing, such as physician 
discretion in allocating the resources available with respect to covered services.  On 
the other hand, government health plans have relied on stream-lining reimbursement 
and have only recently begun to consider price-sharing and other forms of rationing 
as a means of controlling escalating health care costs.16   
A.  A Brief History of Managed Care 
Rationing may be defined in several ways.  Webster’s dictionary defines 
rationing as “to distribute equitably” or “to use sparingly.”17  Additionally, Webster’s 
defines a ration as “a share especially as determined by supply.”18  We ration many 
things in everyday life from determining monthly grocery budgets to allocating 
available vacation time.  In many instances, the idea of rationing evokes impressions 
of self-restraint and preparedness for an uncertain future. 
However, as a nation, we dislike the idea of rationing health care.  When used in 
the context of health care, rationing strikes an unpleasant chord in many of us and 
often raises the unanswerable question – how much is life worth?  Life is precious 
and we would like to believe that we will implement any treatment that offers the 
chance of preserving that life regardless of cost.19  Most of all, we would like to 
believe that we live in a society that does not ration health care and that the absence 
                                                                
15See David Mechanic, Professional Judgment and the Rationing of Medical Care, 140 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1713, 1713 (1992) (discussing several approaches to health care rationing in the 
private sector including “cost-sharing with patients (price rationing); administrative limits on 
technological expansion, reimbursable services, and provider remuneration (explicit 
rationing); and discretionary allocation of services within the constraints of established 
budgets (implicit rationing)”). 
16See Jonathan Oberlander, The Politics of Medicare Reform, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1095, 1102 (2003) (describing Medicare’s foundation as a public insurance program and 
reflecting that “[t]he most compelling argument in favor of public medical insurance for the 
elderly was that the market had failed to meet their needs”). 
17WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (2005), available at http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/ rationing. 
18WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (2005), available at http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/ ration. 
19Mechanic, supra note 15, at 1745 (discussing the “rule of rescue”).  
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of rationing renders us one of the best health care systems in the world, regardless of 
statistics that may suggest otherwise.20 
In fact, Americans have been rationing health care for almost ninety years.  In 
1929, several hundred Oklahoma farmers and their families enrolled in a prepaid 
health care plan under which routine patient care was administered for a 
predetermined, prepaid flat fee.21  In 1933, Harold Hatch, an insurance agent, 
proposed paying a flat, fixed fee in advance for the medical care of construction 
workers building the Los Angeles Aqueduct in the Mojave Desert.22  The idea of 
prepaid health care captured the imagination of Henry Kaiser who persuaded the 
same physician to offer a similar service for construction workers building the Grand 
Coulee Dam 5 years later.23 
Continued technological advancements in the medical field fueled escalating 
health care costs and spurred the Nixon administration to propose the development 
of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in 1971.24  The concept of managed 
care continued to develop over the next few decades until the 1997 Balanced Budget 
Act introduced managed care options to the Medicare market.25 
Ultimately, prepaid health plans and managed care rationing reflect the often 
unacknowledged reality that the cost of health care can easily spiral out of control.  
Managed care represents an attempt to limit those costs while promising continued 
delivery of some necessary health care services in the future.26  The introduction of 
managed care plans into the Medicare program suggested for the first time that the 
escalating health care costs faced by the elderly were no longer costs that our society 
could afford to shoulder to the same degree as it had in the past; the cost of some 
medical treatments would increasingly fall on individual Medicare beneficiaries. 
                                                                
20See Stephen Ohlemacher, U.S. 42nd in Global Life Expectancy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
(August 11, 2007), http://www.presstelegram.com/news/ci_6603357 (reporting that the United 
States currently ranks forty-second internationally with respect to life expectancy and infant 
mortality and that contributing factors include the country’s rising epidemic of obesity, the 
lower life expectancy and increased infant mortality among African Americans, and the 
absence of a national health insurance program).  See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GLOBAL 
POPULATION PROFILE: 2002 (March 22, 2004), http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wp02/tabA-
12.pdf. 
21See TUFTS MANAGED CARE INSTITUTE, A BRIEF HISTORY OF MANAGED CARE, (1998), 
http://www.tmci.org/downloads/BriefHist.pdf [hereinafter Tufts]. 
22Id. 
23Id.  See also Kaiser Permanente Founding & History (2007), http://www.kaisersantarosa. 
org/about/kaiser/history . 
24Tufts, supra note 21. 
25Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1121. 
26See Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Health Care’s “Thirty Years War”: The 
Origins and Dissolution of Managed Care, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 285 (2004) 
(declaring that “medicine is not a stable industry, and its development is shaped by economic 
and political factors as much as by science.  Medical insurance does not just pay for medical 
care – it shapes the medical care delivery system, determines what treatments are developed, 
and formulates our view of what constitutes medical care.”). 
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B.  The Founding of Medicare 
The institution of Medicare represents far more than our nation’s attempt to fund 
the health care needs of its elderly.  Like commercial health insurance, its evolution 
as an institution reflects changes in the economic current, public policy, and political 
climate of this nation.27  Also like commercial health insurance, it “does not just pay 
for medical care” but also impacts the future shape and continuing evolution of our 
medical care delivery system, including the sort of technological advancements we 
will seek and the expectations we will hold as a society about what constitutes 
adequate health care.28  Certainly, Medicare’s current Byzantine architecture defies 
any accurate analysis without some understanding of the societal forces that formed 
it and the historical and political forces that continue to shape it.29 
The idea of government-sponsored health insurance first drew national attention 
in the 1930s.30  The Committee on Economic Security was formed by President 
Franklin Roosevelt to draft a Social Security bill and included in its original report a 
promise of some future national health care plan.31  A strong initial negative reaction 
to the proposal prompted an eventual revision of this report, but the idea had already 
taken hold, and vigorous debates followed on the issue of national health care.32  
Even then, these debates polarized along the lines of socialized health care, an idea 
which the American Medical Association strongly opposed, and continued adherence 
to a private commercial insurance model, which, at that time, most often consisted of 
fee-for-service payment.33   
Proposals for a national health care system experienced significant setbacks when 
many of its supporters suffered political defeats in the 1950s.34  This reversal of 
political fortunes prompted many to propose restrictions on any eventual national 
coverage that may be formed to an elderly sub-population alone.35  Finally, Social 
Security added disability benefits to its coverage in 1956, easing the path to some 
form of a limited national health care coverage program.36 
In 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson won his bid for the presidency and brought into 
office his concept of a “Great Society.”37  Liberal candidates won widespread 
victories in the 1964 elections which temporarily quieted the continuing ideological 
                                                                
27Marmor, supra note 14, at 1143. 
28McLean, supra note 26, at 285. 
29Marmor, supra note 14, at 1138. 
30See Twight, supra note 4, at 313 (proposing that initial forays into the idea of a national 
health care coverage plan was inspired in part by “Bismarck’s 1883 program in Germany.”). 
31Id. 
32Id. at 315.  See also Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1099. 
33Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1099. 
34Twight, supra note 4, at 315-16. 
35Id. 
36Id. 
37Id. at 313. 
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debate over national health care.38  Rather than settling existing disagreements, 
however, the enactment of the Medicare program in 1965 marked not only the birth 
of national health care benefits in the United States but also continued the debate 
over whether national health care was a matter of social justice or market 
economics.39 
As initially enacted, Medicare provided two types of benefits.  Under Part A, 
Medicare covered basic hospital costs for those over age sixty-five.40  These benefits 
were later extended to apply to those with end-stage renal disease.41  Currently, Part 
A covers in-patient hospital care for up to 150 days, home health care, hospice care, 
and in-patient psychiatric care for a lifetime limit of 190 days.42  Part A is funded by 
tax revenue placed into the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund.43 
Medicare Part B differs from Part A in three key ways.  First, enrollment in Part 
B is voluntary.44  Second, Part B benefits require the payment of a premium.45  Third, 
Part B benefits cover primarily outpatient physician services, including some 
outpatient rehabilitative services and some medical equipment needs.46  Part B is 
funded by the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund.47 
Funding health care soon became a problem in both private and public arenas.  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, rising health care costs prompted commercial 
insurers to offer managed care options alongside traditional fee-for-service plans, 
and gradually managed care plans became the dominant available form of 
commercial insurance.48  At the same time, rising health care costs resulted in 
shortfalls in Medicare funding in the 1970s and 1980s that in turn prompted 
                                                                
38Id. at 318.  See also Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1099 (describing this “liberal 
landslide” as helping to settle a “high-profile, ideological, and highly partisan political 
contest” and led to “Medicare’s enactment . . . with a much broader scope and a more 
generous benefit package than even program advocates had thought possible.”). 
39Lee, supra note 1, at 16-17. 
4042 U.S.C.A. § 1395c (West 2000). 
41Id.  See Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1102-3 (discussing the initial ideological debate as 
to whether Medicare should be fashioned as an adjunct to commercial insurance or take the 
form of a public insurance program, its initial coverage limits which extended only to the 
elderly, and the eventual addition of coverage for the disabled and those with end-stage renal 
disease).  See also Marmor, supra note 14, at 1151 (detailing key objections in Medicare’s 
initial formulation and discussing how those objectives have remained largely unattained 
beyond the general provision of health care coverage “for the elderly, the disabled, and those 
suffering from renal failure.”). 
4242 U.S.C.A. § 1395d (West 2000). 
4342 U.S.C.A. § 1395i (West 2000). 
4442 U.S.C.A. § 1395o (West 2000). 
4542 U.S.C.A. § 1395r (West 2000). 
4642 U.S.C.A. § 1395k (West 2000). 
4742 U.S.C.A. § 1395t (West 2000). 
48Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1114. 
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increased regulation of medical providers and a prospective fee payment schedule.49  
Medicare remained a single-payor, public insurance program managing relatively 
impressive cost savings with the instituted reforms.50 
However, persistent, recurrent shortfalls in Medicare funding during the 1990s 
resulted in far more upheaval.51  Discussions regarding the future of national health 
care coverage in this country became increasingly polarized and echoed in many 
ways the ideological debates of the 1950s and 1960s that had preceded the initial 
enactment of the Medicare program.52  Medicare’s ballooning costs were perceived 
as a key cause of the ever-deepening national deficit.53  Furthermore, concerns over 
the impending retirement of the Baby Boomer generation raised specters of Medicare 
trust fund insolvency in the near future.54  Controlling health care costs became a 
fiscal imperative, and an increasingly conservative political landscape favored 
allowing market forces a greater role in shaping the reform of the Medicare 
program.55 
                                                                
49Id. at 1104-05. 
50Id. at 1107.  See also Robert Pear, Bush to Propose Curbing Growth in Medicare Cost, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/04/ 
politics/04budget.html  (summarizing briefly the history of cutting Medicare costs in order to 
forward a proposed budget plan).  See also Amy Goldstein, 2007 Budget Favors Defense: 
Medicare Takes Biggest Hit in $2.7 Trillion Plan, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2006) at AO1, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/04/AR20060204 
01179.html (describing proposed future cuts in Medicare costs in order to eliminate the 
national deficit by 2012).  See also Robert Pear, Bush’s Medicare Budget Would Raise 
Premiums, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2007), at A1, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/ 
04/washington/04budget.html (reflecting on the continuing shift in Medicare policy whereby 
an increasing percentage of incurred health care costs must be born by the individual Medicare 
beneficiary, including the burden of rising Medicare premiums). 
51The increasing cost of funding Medicare and the subsequent shortfalls in that funding 
would also prompt many to question the wisdom of continuing to provide such entitlements to 
a select portion of our population at particular cost to rest of our society.  See Robert H. 
Binstock, Public Policies on Aging in the Twenty-First Century, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
311, 312 (1998) (discussing Americans’ progression as a society from conceptualizing the 
elderly during the New Deal and Great Society eras as dependent on societal support to more 
recent stereotyping of the elderly as the country’s retirement “elite”).  See also Joseph White, 
(How) is Aging a Health Policy Problem?, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 47, 47-49 
(2004) (arguing that aging poses less of a threat to health care costs escalation than other 
factors such as pension expenses and how to deliver necessary health care). 
52Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1108. 
53Id. at 1110. 
54Id. at 1112.  See also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC 
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2008-2017 (2007), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=7731 
(stating that Baby Boomers will become eligible for Social Security benefits in 2008, 
triggering an increase in Social Security spending and, by implication, Medicare spending 
from four and one-half percent in 2008 to six and one-half percent by 2017 and arguing that 
“[e]ither a substantial reduction in the growth of spending, a significant increase in tax 
revenues relative to the size of the economy, or some combination of spending and revenue 
changes will be necessary to promote the nation’s long-term fiscal stability.”).  
55Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1109. 
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This tense political and national climate set the stage for the introduction of 
managed care plans into the Medicare program.  The 1997 Balanced Budget Act 
proposed creating a new Medicare + Choice option that offered a range of managed 
care options to Medicare beneficiaries.56  However, the plan failed to include a price 
incentive or terms obligating private insurers to remain in the program even in the 
case of net loss.57   
Furthermore, Medicare + Choice plans lacked the necessary economic impetus 
that had made managed care a relatively successful strategy in the private market.  
“Managed competition seeks to control health care costs by having patients pay the 
costs of choosing more expensive health plans that compete in a regulated private 
market.”58  In the absence of defined contributions and the subsequent financial 
pressure that would encourage Medicare beneficiaries to move out of the traditional 
Medicare payor scheme, Medicare + Choice programs “lacked the key cost control 
mechanism of managed competition.”59  Medicare’s first foray into managed care 
failed to effectively bring into the Medicare arena cost-containment strategies from 
the private sector in part because of the absence of similar competitive market forces 
on which private insurers heavily relied. 
After a brief fiscal rally, the pressures of escalating health care costs and a 
worsening deficit again precipitated interest in Medicare reform as a crucial factor in 
the national budget.  Medicare reform emerged as an important factor in the 2000 
election.60  Although only ranked fourth overall by voters, control of rising health 
care costs in general and prescription drug costs in particular remained high-profile 
issues in the 2004 election.61  Although supplemental insurance plans existed that 
offered prescription coverage, their premiums were increasing rapidly.  This increase 
in supplemental insurance premiums in combination with rising Medigap62 premiums 
and the increasingly palpable gap between Medicare’s absence of outpatient 
prescription coverage and the standard coverage already available in the private 
sector set the stage for the introduction of a national prescription drug coverage 
program and, with it, increasing the role of privatization in Medicare’s public 
insurance program.63 
                                                                
56Id. at 1121. 
57Id. at 1126-27. 
58Id. at 1123. 
59Id. at 1127. 
60Id. at 1128. 
61See Robert J. Blendon, Health Care in the 2004 Presidential Election, 351 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1314, 1314 (2004) (analyzing data from twenty-two national opinion surveys and 
concluding that voters considered the cost of health care and prescription drugs, Medicare, and 
the uninsured’s access to health care among the most concerning health care issues). 
62Medigap is supplemental health insurance sold by private insurance companies to help 
pay costs that the individual’s Medicare plan would not otherwise cover.  See Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Supplement Health Insurance Medigap - 
Overview at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/Medigap (defining Medigap as a “policy is health 
insurance sold by private insurance companies to fill the ‘gaps’in Original Medicare Plan 
coverage.”). 
63Oberlander, supra note 16, at 1129-30. 
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III. INTRODUCING THE MEDICARE MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003 
Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act (MMA) in 2003, incorporating prescription drug coverage 
benefits into the Medicare program for the first time since its inception.64  The MMA 
also heralded a striking change in the ideological mindset guiding Medicare policy in 
that it promoted increased reliance on private sector insurers, and the efficiencies of 
market economics on which they rely, to slow down Medicare’s rocketing costs. 
The MMA created Medicare Part D which provides for voluntary enrollment in 
one of several plans covering outpatient prescription drug costs.65  Under Part D, 
private insurers offer prescription drug benefits to Medicare beneficiaries either 
through Prescription Drug Plans in a traditional Medicare fee-for-service Part A and 
B coverage plan or through Medicare Advantage plans under a Medicare Part C 
managed care option.66  These private plans must provide coverage for drugs listed 
under the established Medicare formulary.67  These private plans may include 
additional drugs that exceed Medicare requirements within their chosen formularies 
but may also cease coverage of these non-formulary medications without 
forewarning the Medicare beneficiaries who have enrolled to receive prescription 
drug coverage under their particular plan.68 
For many, the proposed Part D coverage raised two immediate concerns.  First, 
the required Medicare formulary promised to be more restricted than many state 
Medicaid formularies.69  However, Medicaid recipients would eventually be required 
to enroll in Medicare prescription plans that would increase their drug costs while 
decreasing their selection.70  Second, Part D’s payment scheme allowed for a 
“doughnut hole” in coverage that would result in higher out-of-pocket expenses for 
many beneficiaries.  Under Part D as initially proposed, beneficiaries remained 
responsible for the first $250 incurred in prescription drug costs.71  Part D would 
                                                                
64Id. at 1133. 
65Susan Adler Channick, The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003: Will It Be Good Medicine for U.S. Health Policy?, 14 ELDER L. J. 
237, 246 (2006). 
66See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-101 (West 2006).  See also Channick, supra, note 64, at 237 
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67See THE CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL’S 
PART D FACT SHEET, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MLNProducts/downloads/Part_D_Resource_ 
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convulsants” but not covering “barbiturates; benzodiazepines; drugs used for anorexia, weight 
loss or weight gain; fertility drugs; drugs used for cosmetic purposes or hair growth; cough 
and cold medicines; prescription vitamins and minerals, and over-the-counter drugs.”) (last 
visited on Sept. 10, 2007). 
6842 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-102 (West 2006).   
69Channick, supra note 65, at 248. 
70Id. at 250-51. 
7142 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-102(b)(1)(A)(i) (West 2006).  In order to simplify the discussion, 
2006 coverage stipulations are used when detailing out-of-pocket expenses in this paragraph. 
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cover seventy-five percent of the next $2000 of incurred prescription drug costs.72  
The beneficiary would then bear the full burden of further drug costs until the 
beneficiary’s total out-of-pocket costs (not simply costs charged) exceeded $3600.73  
Past that point, Part D would pay ninety-five percent of any additional prescription 
drug costs incurred.74 
Although supplemental “doughnut hole” coverage is available, coverage under 
such plans would generally be limited to generic drugs only and would come at a 
considerable premium.75  Furthermore, should a Medicare beneficiary elect not to 
enroll for Part D benefits when first eligible, that beneficiary would be subject to a 
late enrollment penalty of one percent of the beneficiary’s base premium.76  This 
penalty may be waived if the beneficiary can show alternate prescription drug 
coverage for the pertinent time period.77 
The MMA marks a striking change in Medicare policy, most critically it brought 
to life “the conservative vision of Medicare as a competitive market in which the 
federal government subsidizes beneficiaries to purchase private insurance.”78  Some 
are concerned that the MMA signals “a clear commitment to the private market to 
solve social problems.”79  Certainly, MMA and Medicare Part D introduce two 
fundamental changes with respect to Medicare policy.   
First, by mandating enrollment in Part D by those individuals with dual eligibility 
for both Medicare and Medicaid benefits, Part D introduces a new level of 
federalism into the mix of state and federal health care assistance programs.80  
Congress enacted the Medicaid program in 1965 in a political climate that looked 
favorably upon the idea of universal health insurance.81  Medicaid programs function 
primarily at a state level with the individual states defining eligibility levels and 
determining optional expansions, sometimes supported in their decisions by federal 
                                                                
7242 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-102(b)(2)(A) (West 2006). 
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mandates.82  State funds for many of these programs may be matched on occasion by 
federal funds.83   
However, the MMA requires that states contribute funds to the Part D 
prescription benefit program for those seniors who previously received their drug 
benefits under state Medicaid plans, and it also includes a complex formula to 
determine the amount states must pay to the federal government as part of their Part 
D contribution.84  The only factor within that formula that remains under state 
control is the number of individuals meeting state eligibility criteria for dual 
enrollment in both Medicaid and Medicare programs.85  As states confront worsening 
budget crises of their own, this mandatory contribution to the Part D prescription 
drug plan will likely result in notable retrenchment in eligibility requirements for 
existing Medicaid programs.86 
Second, by allowing private entities to negotiate drug pricing with 
pharmaceutical companies and thereby define the tiered system by which 
beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket expenses are determined, Part D fundamentally 
redefines a government health care program’s method of reimbursement with respect 
to private pharmaceutical companies.87  For example, the Veteran’s Affairs model 
represents a more centralized public health care model in which a single government 
entity, such as the Secretary of Veteran’s Affairs, negotiates directly with 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to determine drug pricing.88   
Although such a system has proven relatively successful in negotiating favorable 
prescription drug prices for plan beneficiaries, the MMA implements a 
“decentralized competitive pricing model” in which the private insurers providing 
prescription drug coverage under Part D negotiate drug costs independently with 
pharmaceutical manufacturers.89  Clearly, the hope would be that market forces 
should ensure competitive drug pricing in such a setting; however, where a particular 
drug lacks competition or is unique in its benefits, the decentralized system may not 
afford significant cost-containment benefits.90 
The MMA put into effect a federal prescription drug benefit program in response 
to apparently high public demand for such benefits.  However, the actual benefits of 
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84Channick, supra note 65, at 251. 
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86Id.  See also Grogan, supra note 81, at 850-55 (postulating that increased fiscal pressures 
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the Part D program may be mitigated by several factors including a limited 
formulary; a sizeable “doughnut hole” in mid-coverage during which Part D 
beneficiaries remain 100 percent responsible for out-of-pocket costs of prescribed 
medications; potential cutbacks in Medicaid programs as a result of mandatory 
contributions to the Part D program; and the mixed efficacy of a decentralized 
competitive pricing model for negotiated drug costs. 
IV.  RATIONING HEALTH CARE UNDER MEDICARE 
In the midst of these turbulent debates over the future of our existing national 
health care program, a general consensus appears to exist on one issue alone:  
Medicare cannot survive as it is currently structured.  The Secretary of Health and 
Human Services has stated that “Medicare is simply not sustainable in the long-term 
in its present form” because of its persistently escalating costs.91  In discussing the 
proposed 2008 Medicare budget, he stated that “[t]here will never be enough money 
to satisfy all wants and needs, and we had to make some tough choices.”92  The issue 
then is not if health care should be rationed, but how to best go about formulating a 
plan of rationing and who should determine the ultimate allocation of our available 
health care resources.   
Rationing can take many forms.  At least one attempt has been made to divide 
potential methods of rationing into three specific approaches.93  These approaches 
include cost-sharing with beneficiaries, administrative constraints on technological 
expansion and remuneration for services (explicit rationing), and health provider 
discretion in the allocation of services under an established budget (implicit 
rationing).94  Explicit rationing includes administrative constraints on a particular 
health care plan in an effort to limit expenditures under that plan, including precise 
limitations on what treatment modalities may be covered.95  Implicit rationing relies 
on the clinical relationship between physician and patient to streamline the health 
care services a particular individual may require or should be offered.96  Under 
implicit rationing, the physician exercises her professional discretion in determining 
the health care options for which a particular patient may be considered.97   
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Both explicit and implicit rationing bring with them particular pitfalls.  Repeated, 
successful litigation against managed care entities has caused many private insurers 
to shy away from the more explicit forms of health care rationing.98  As a result, 
many private insurers now prefer to follow a more implicit model of rationing where 
the physician serves as both patient advocate and resource administrator.99  Some 
argue that the relationship between physician and patient includes a unique bond of 
trust that can withstand the dual role that physicians would fill under an implicit 
rationing model.100  However, others have argued that the bond of trust between 
physician and patient is not so resilient as to allow a persistent reliance on this 
duality.101 
Current efforts to curb Medicare expenditure have focused on three potentially 
cost-saving measures.  First, efforts to improve national health information 
technology continue to receive broad-ranging support under the assumption that 
increased efficiency in this area will translate into general cost savings.102  Second, 
efforts to reduce health care fraud and abuse continue to be viewed as a potentially 
major source of savings.103  Third, expanding on the initial forays into privatization 
under Medicare Part D may also provide further, much-needed savings.104 
Introducing privatization into a public insurance program poses several important 
questions, however.  As first enacted, Medicare functioned as a form of national 
health insurance.105  Payment collected through tax revenues or voluntary premiums 
were in turn meted out through a government plan.106  Although including private 
insurers in the program allows for some shifting of health care costs to the 
beneficiary as well as the private sector, the continued success of the program will 
likely still require some government funding to ensure continued private sector 
participation.  As demonstrated by the failed Medicare + Choice program, the 
inevitable escalation of health care costs demands that the government provide some 
incentive for private insurers to remain in the business of providing health care 
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benefits to the elderly, a sub-population that is already more likely to utilize 
available health care resources.107  As such, funding Part D promises to continue 
being a challenge. 
Part D also presents a risk of increasing the number of uninsured or underinsured 
Americans.  The convoluted Part D benefits system has already proven difficult for 
many beneficiaries to navigate.108  These beneficiaries may become underinsured or 
uninsured under the Medicare program either because they are bewildered by the 
choices before them, unclear as to what benefits their Medicare plan actually affords 
them, or simply unable to afford the additional coverage they now require to provide 
the coverage they initially expected under Part D. 
Finally, Part D may be premised on a comforting but inaccurate assumption – 
that private sector market economics provides a more efficient paradigm under 
which to allocate health care resources.  The private sector suffered greater losses 
during the initial eras of managed care than did Medicare under its policy of 
streamlined reimbursement and increased administrative controls.109  Furthermore, 
private, commercial insurance costs continue to rise, pricing themselves out of the 
market for many Americans and resulting in an escalating number of uninsured or 
underinsured citizens.110  In turn, that lapse in health care coverage has resulted in an 
increased burden on the Medicare system.111   
Increasingly, personal resources determine access to health care.  With the 
gradual erosion of services provided under public insurance programs, those who 
depend on those services and whose personal resources do not allow them to seek 
health care in the private market are often left not seeking essential health care when 
necessary.112  However, those with greater personal resources may obtain a better 
quality of health care through an emerging market of more personalized health care 
delivery systems such as concierge medicine.113  In the end, the private health care 
insurance market has ensured a system where the more prosperous Americans are 
able to live longer lives, in better health, simply because they have the money to 
afford to do so.  Reliance on such a system as a means of supporting the health care 
needs of the elderly in our society promises to be worrisome at best. 
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Currently, our national health care policy appears to have been dictated by the 
winds of the prevailing political climate and relatively short-term economic 
considerations.  The absence of any enduring guiding principle to our health care 
agenda has resulted in an arcane system that appears impossible to meaningfully 
comprehend and even more impossible to reform in a productive fashion.  Most 
health care reform proposals either propose unrealistically that we start the system 
over from scratch or appear unbelievable in their Byzantine architecture as 
necessitated by the existing intricacies of our Medicare network.114   
Privatization of our existing system may promise short-term relief of our current 
cost concerns.  However, it also promises to potentially curtail access to basic health 
care services without a burdensome drain on beneficiaries’ personal resources, a 
drain that many beneficiaries may not be able to afford.115  Although such cost-
sharing may appear reasonable at first glance, its long-term effects may include 
reduced access to care for some of our most vulnerable citizens who currently rely 
on government-subsidized health care programs, particularly the disabled and the 
elderly, especially elderly women whose life expectancy continues to exceed their 
male counterparts.116  In the end, cost containment through privatization of existing 
government-subsidized programs may come at the price of increasing socioeconomic 
stratification within our society through rationing access to health care, arguably one 
of our most fundamental needs.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
The continuing debate over national health care raises several critical questions.  
Is access to health care a right?  Should the quality of an individual’s health care be 
dictated by socioeconomic standing?  Do we as a society bear any responsibility for 
ensuring equal access to existing health care resources?  
Our answers to these questions will define our culture and reflect what we value 
most as a society.  How we choose to address these issues of national health care 
policy promises to become our most enduring legacy, both to future generations in 
our country as well as to the world at large.  We should not allow these answers to be 
dictated by narrow economic considerations alone.  We must confront these 
questions with full acknowledgment of their ideological ramifications and not allow 
ourselves the luxury of oversimplification. 
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